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Abstract
The institution of marriage is the foundation of the family and of society. Even
though it is a private institution, it has been regulated by society, depending
on the specic time and history, religious perceptions, legal rules or customs,
and norms. According to historical judicial interpretation, marriage has been
viewed as a heterosexual union, same-sex rela-tionships are precluded from the
denition of "marriage". Same-sex relationships, regardless of their duration,
have not been legally recognised in most countries and, as a result, homosexual
partners are denied many of the legal and eco-nomic privileges automatically
granted with the marital status. Only recently, some countries have become
more open to grant rights for same-sex couples, but the justication is rather
on egalitarian than on economic grounds. The aim of the paper is to examine
whether restricting the marriage option to heterosexual couples is ecient. It
will be argued that there are hardly any grounds for denying same-sex couples
the rights heterosexuals are granted when they wish to enter a legally recog-
nised relationship. Furthermore, legalising same-sex marriage and implement-
ing a social change might bring about a welfare gain for society as a whole. Yet,
tradition and social values might make it more desir-able to let the relationship
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Abstract 
The institution of marriage is the foundation of the family and of society. Even though it is a private institution, it has 
been regulated by society, depending on the specific time and history, religious perceptions, legal rules or customs, and 
norms. According to historical judicial interpretation, marriage has been viewed as a heterosexual union, same-sex 
relationships are precluded from the definition of "marriage". Same-sex relationships, regardless of their duration, have 
not been legally recognised in most countries and, as a result, homosexual partners are denied many of the legal and 
economic privileges automatically granted with the marital status. Only recently, some countries have become more open 
to grant rights for same-sex couples, but the justification is rather on egalitarian than on economic grounds.  
The aim of the paper is to examine whether restricting the marriage option to heterosexual couples is efficient. It will be 
argued that there are hardly any grounds for denying same-sex couples the rights heterosexuals are granted when they 
wish to enter a legally recognised relationship. Furthermore, legalising same-sex marriage and implementing a social 
change might bring about a welfare gain for society as a whole. Yet, tradition and social values might make it more 
desirable to let the relationship be recognised under a different name than “marriage”: a domestic partnership. 
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1.1 Introduction and Overview 
Much has been written about the economics of the family1 in general and marriage in particular.2 However, an 
economic analysis of same-sex marriage, which has been legalised in most European countries either framed 
as a registered partnership (Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, France, Germany) or as marriage (Netherlands) only 
recently, is still missing.3 The present paper will provide an economic analysis of same-sex marriage discussing 
the costs and benefits involved, not only for gay couples but also for the society as a whole. The objective is 
to enlighten the hotly debated topic, that has been fostered by the resolution of the European Parliament 
passed on in March, 2000. It recommended that same-sex unions be granted the same legal recognition as 
heterosexual marriages.4
The legal and legislative debates about the legalisation of same-sex marriage involve many unresolved – and 
maybe unsolvable – controversies such as the definition of marriage, the meaning of family, the notion of 
morality, the right of privacy, the influence of religion, the scope of civil rights and the government policies 
with respect to these issues.5 The present analysis does not seek to solve the irresolvable. In contrast to the 
normative issues mentioned above, the paper is intended to present a positive analysis of marriage with 
respect to homosexual couples. The last part, however gives normative conclusions drawn from the economic 
analysis.  
The institution of marriage is the foundation of the family and of society.6 Even though it is a private 
institution, it has been regulated by society, depending on the specific time and history, religious perceptions, 
legal rules or customs, and norms.7 According to past judicial interpretation, marriage is regarded as bond, in 
which men and women “unite their lives, establish families, and connect human communities across the generations”.8 Since 
it has historically been viewed as a heterosexual union, same-sex relationships are precluded from the 
definition of "marriage". Homosexual relationships, regardless of their duration, are not legally recognised in 
most countries and, as a result, homosexual partners are denied many of the legal and economic privileges 
automatically granted with the marital status.9
The aim of the present analysis is to examine whether the restriction with respect to marriage is efficient. It 
will be argued that there are hardly any grounds for denying same-sex couples the rights heterosexuals are 
granted when they decide to engage in a legally recognised relationship. Yet, tradition and social values might 
make it more desirable to term the relationship be differently than “marriage”, i.e. domestic partnership.  
The analysis proceeds as follows: The second section presents an economic analysis of marriage. The family 
has several economising features, that involve not only the commitment and mutual support, but also include 
1 See for example Becker, G. (1993), Bergstrom, T. (1996) and Cabrillo, F. (1999). 
2 See for an extensive study for example Grossbard-Shechtman, S. (1993) or an overview article Cohen, D. (1987). 
3 As to my knowledge, there exists only one explicit analysis of same-sex marriage in the US, this paper however is not 
available in Europe.  
4 See Robinson, B. (2001), p. 1. 
5 See Alm, J./ Badgett, L./ Whittington, L. (2000), p. 2. 
6 See Eskridge, W. (1996), p. 63. 
7 See Cabrillo, F. (1999), p. 4. 
8 See Coolidge, D. (1996), p. 1. 
9 See Lauw, I. (1994), p. 4. 
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the division of labour, joint consumption, the promotion of marriage-specific investments such as children, 
the savings of transaction costs and the pooling of risk. In order to let these gains materialise, the law protects 
and promotes the institution of marriage. It will be shown that the benefits provided by marriage not only 
apply for opposite, but also same-sex partnerships and that homosexuals gained if the government extended 
marriage specific benefits to them. The third part discusses alternative available options enhancing the 
advantages of long-term stable unions, i.e. cohabitation and private contracting. Although both alternatives 
can provide the partners with more flexibility and avoid ill-fitting regulations, they cannot resemble the 
symbolism marriage entails. Moreover they put serious requirements on the parties, since they have to 
contract for any provision they regard as necessary to secure against. The fourth section contrasts the costs 
and benefits of enlarging the institution of marriage to same-sex couples. It will be shown that the legalisation 
might entail several positive externalities impinging on society, as they might help to overcome the 
suppressive climate and the prejudices that still prevail. Yet, marriage is an institution that is based on values 
and traditions, whose changes are neither easy to implement nor possible to predict. Accordingly, not only the 
costs associated with marriage itself, but also the costs of changing these values have to be considered. The 
final part discusses on which ground a change can be justified and which requirements have to be met. The 
conclusion demonstrates that society might be best served, if same-sex couples would not be granted the 
marriage license, but get access to an alternative provision: domestic partnership ordinances. 
The appendix gives an overview of the legal regulations concerning the recognition of same-sex marriage in 
the EU. When available, data about the registered couples are given.  
 
2 Marriage and its implications for heterosexual and homosexual couples 
2.1 Introduction  
The section provides an economical justification of the protection of the institution of marriage, since it 
enhances not only the welfare of the couple involved but also benefits the society as a whole. Accordingly, the 
law promotes and defends marriage in recognising the gains it implies. Marriage form an economic point of 
view is regarded as a contract that promotes specific behaviour. Its gains arise from sharing and coordination 
as well as specialisation in household production and durable and mutual care. The advantages and their 
division influence the decisions to marry and to stay married.10 
2.2 Marriage and the law  
Marriage is a long-term voluntary agreement of private parties for the purpose of joint production and 
consumption.11 Husband and wife exchange spousal service and invest - in reliance on the commitment they 
give to each other - in assets specific to the marriage. Meanwhile they forgo opportunities for marriage and 
other activities.12 The promise given in the marriage vows, to “take the other as a wedded spouse to have and to hold, 
10 See Weiss, Y. (2000), p. 3. Accordingly, it will be assumed that an individual decides to marry if the benefits of marriage 
exceed the costs.  
11 See Weiss, Y. (2000), p. 1, Posner, R. (1998a), p. 155-156, and Cabrillo, F. (1999), pp. 20. 
12 See Cohen,  L. (1987), p. 267. 
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for richer or the poorer, in sickness and in health, for the better or for worse, from this day forward” 13 indicate that they both 
grant to live together, provide the other with care and support and that the bonds are to last for a long time.  
In order to advance these benefits the law encourages individuals to form economically stable families that 
provide the members with the life’s necessities14 and protects the contractual features by damage remedies 
enhanced in the regulations concerning divorce. In addition, married persons are treated differently than 
singles, reflecting society’s judgement about the desirability of the institution of marriage. Matrimony is 
considered as favourable since couples not only care about their own, but also their partner’s well-being, 
parents share responsibilities especially with regard to child-rearing and provide financial support to each 
other. This offers a built-in stability that relieves the government from intervention in situations of financial 
distress. Furthermore married adults are usually healthier and live longer, provide a more stable customer base 
for business and industry and a stronger labour force.15 In the next sections the gains form marriage are 
introduced. It will be discussed how the law protects these interests.  
 
2.3 Intangible gains 
The gains from marriage are not only purely instrumental (i.e. not valuable in themselves but rather by the 
provisions marriage provides), but also direct, i.e. because of the fact that the commitment was formed. 
Engaging in marriage is valuable in itself, as the parties adhere a spiritual join of two souls into one. The long-
term commitment serves as a device for love, and evidence that the spouse is worth that love.16 
Regulations recognising the emotional attachment are such that authorise a family member to make 
emergency medical decisions and appoint the spouse as a guardian: He is allowed to make decisions about 
their residence, care and financial matters. In addition inheritance will be designated to him/ her if the 
deceased spouse has failed to set up a will and there are no surviving children. These regulations are justified 
as the partner is understood as a soul mate and caretaker. They not only reduce transaction costs (See 2.4.1), 
but also reinforce the intimacy of the relationship and promote altruism. 
 
2.4 Tangible gains17 
2.4.1 Reduction of transaction costs 
Marriage can be seen as a standard form contract.18 In a contract, the parties can expect their investments to 
be protected and their agreements to be governed by contract law through damage remedies. Standardised 
terms reduce transaction costs, since they avoid bargaining over specific aspects the parties would have agreed 
13 See Brining, M. /Crafton, S. (1994), p. 21. 
14 See Badgett, M.V. (1996), p. 1. 
15 See Badgett, M.V. (1996), p. 1. 
16 See Cohen, L. (1987), p. 269. 
17 The financial/ tangible (instrumental) gains are those that allow investment in assets of value specific to their 
relationship, which would not occur in the absence of a contract and the insurance it provides securing risk-averse 
individuals. See Cohen, L. (1987), p. 269. 
18 The freedom of contract is limited by the law, since in marriage many terms of the union - such as regulations 
concerning mutual support or inheritance -  are prescribed by the state and cannot be changed by private agents. 
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to anyway.19 Similarly, the government’s intervention in marriage is a means to reduce transaction costs that 
occur in the negotiation of clauses by providing specific rules (such as the provision of spousal support and 
necessaries).20 Divorce rules determine how the property will be separated and how alimony is chosen. The 
regularised process for the division of joint assets serves as a reference in case of the resolution of the union.21 
Transaction costs are also saved in the set of laws relating to incompetence and death (see 2.3). Since most 
people are reluctant to care about mortality and will not set contracts in advance, the designation of the 
competencies to the married partner as the most preferred decision maker avoid the inquiry of the courts to 
engage in family affairs. Unmarried couples do not experience this assumption, hence they have to contract 
privately, which causes transaction costs.  
Yet, even if all persons would execute documents some forms of government regulation cannot be handled 
by private parties. These are the regulations concerning immigration, unpaid leave to care for the spouse with 
serious health conditions, testification in criminal proceedings (the spouse do not have to testify against the 
partner) and the bringing of tort law actions (the partner can sue the injured party for compensation for the 
loss of companionship). In acknowledging those privileges the law recognises the emotional bonds of the 
partners on the one hand (see 2.3 above) and reduces transaction costs and uncertainty on the other.  
 
2.4.2 Credit and investments, deterrence of opportunism and furthering of cooperation and altruism 
Couples frequently offer implicit loans to each other that facilitate investments. If one partner expects to 
profit in providing financial support for the spouse, e.g. by investments in human capital, investments will be 
made which might have been impossible if the other partner lacks financial resources and capital market 
imperfections do not allow these activities to be carried out. The wife, say, may agree to work to support her 
husband in the early years of their union, while he acquires human capital at university. Later in his career, 
both can benefit from his higher earnings due to better education (increasing returns). Hence, she will offer 
him an implicit loan in expectation to benefit from his increased earning capacity.  
The commitment enhanced by marriage assists to achieve lasting cooperation and the motivation to act in the 
family’s interest. Without marriage law, which provides carrots and sticks for the fulfilment of marital 
services,22 the women might fail to make these investments in the fear of being left alone by the husband. The 
husband may have an incentive to appropriate the investments the wife has made: he may want to leave her 
for a younger woman. He could be tempted to do so, as his value in the marriage market has increased 
relatively to his spouse due to his higher income potential. The value of the wife in turn has decreased: The 
chances of remarrying decline with age and in the presence of children. Thus, alimony (damage for the breach 
of contract) and divorce laws not only aim to enhance stability and promote cooperation, but also offer an 
19 See Cooter, R./ Ulen, T. (2000), p. 189.  
20 See Brining, M./ Crafton, S. (1994), p. 874. 
21 See Cabrillo, F. (1999), p. 42. 
22 See Scott, E. (1999), p. 28. 
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insurance for the weaker party against opportunism in making break-up costly.23 Additionally the government 
promotes the forming of a union in offering marriage dependant benefits.  
 
2.4.3 Children  
Children are the most important marital-specific asset and one of the main advantages of the family. 
However, the bearing and rearing of children involve costs. Parents have an interest in the caring of children, 
since they derive utility from it. However, if children are seen as public goods for their parents, an efficient 
investment requires their co-ordination. When spouses live separately, the one not having control or custody 
over the child is likely to reduce the expenditures and contributions for it. This might reduce the “quality” of 
the offspring.24 Conversely, greater proximity furthers altruism and secures that the optimal decision 
respecting the child’s interest will be made. Regulations with regard to parenting are imposed in a way to serve 




When living together the couples can gain from sharing collective (non-rival) goods, that can be jointly 
consumed by both partners. The sharing of non-rival goods such as child quality, common leisure activities, 
housing expenditures and shared information can be substantial.25 The best results with respect to joint 
consumption are obtained if the couples have similar tastes and preferences, since this facilitates decision-
making on collective goods. Accordingly, those couples that belong to the same class, share the same interests 
and have the same religion are more likely to benefit from sharing marriage specific assets. The exemption 
from gift and estate taxes on the one and inheritance tax for the surviving spouse on the other hand are 
regulations intending to facilitate economic sharing and promoting investments in joint property.26 
2.4.5 Risk pooling  
Spouses can spread the risk of shocks to individual members, e.g. if one partner can no longer work or 
becomes unemployed. Marriage encourages the accumulation of precautionary savings and supplies an 
implicit insurance to the spouses. This can be regarded as positive externality, since partners offer themselves 
with financial security, spousal support and mutual care. Accordingly, people have an interest in the stability 
of marriage, since this reduces the burden on the society as a whole.  
23 The law is a means to overcome the time inconsistency problem, that occurs if there was no credible commitment. See 
Cohen, L. (1987), p. 269-271.  
24 See Weiss, Y. (2000), p. 1-2.  
25 Forming a union can almost double the purchasing power of the household. See Weiss, Y. (2000), p. 3. 
26 See Chambers, D. (1996), p. 471.   
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2.4.6 Division of labour 
2.4.6.1 The family as an economic unit 
The family facilitates specialisation and enables the spouses to exploit comparative advantages and increasing 
returns.27 When husband and wife share their work they can benefit from specialisation. If one party 
contributes to the household income by doing the – unpaid - housework, while the other is working on the 
labour market, specialisation enables the couple to obtain a higher family income. The law encourages work 
sharing in the family by allowing the partners to fill in joint tax receipts. Since housework is not rewarded with 
income, the joint tax liability will be lower.  
Traditionally, gains from the division of labour between spouses have been attributed to biological differences 
between men and women. According to this view, an efficient family production will prevail if both partners 
fully specialise in either the labour market or household activities. However, modern families no longer 
resemble these role models. Yet, dividing labour is still beneficial for the parties involved. This will be shown 
in the following paragraphs.28 
2.4.6.2 The traditional view29 
Spouses usually carry out different production activities that contribute to the family income.30 Specialisation 
is based on the criterion of comparative advantage. If every family members specialises in and performs those 
activities, he/ she can do with greater relative efficiency or at lower cost than the other,31 the couple can enjoy 
a greater family income.  
Neoclassical economics32 assumes that the comparative advantages are rooted in the biological differences 
between the sexes. The husband is thought to have a comparative advantage in the labour market, where he 
yields monetary resources. The female in turn experiences comparative advantages in household production 
that can be traced back to her ability to bear and rear children. The husband supplies the income he earned in 
the market to the family, which is used to buy market goods that are inputs for the production of the 
household output, for which the wife is responsible.33 She specialises in home production in transforming the 
market commodities into household output. The division of labour allows both spouses to maximise the 
domestic income.  
The efficiency of the gains from specialisation are enhanced in a dynamic perspective, when the spousal 
partners are allowed to invest in their human capital, hence improving their skills in the area where they had 
27 See Posner, R. (1998a), p. 156. 
28 The models are applications from international trade theory. For a reference see Cabrillo, F. (1999), p. 25-37 for 
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage. The second model is a transformation of the Heckscher-Ohlin model taken 
form Markusen, J./ Melvin, J./ Kaempfer, W./ Maskus, K. (1995). 
29 The argument can also be illustrated graphically. A graphical presentation of both models and an extended version of 
the paper is available from the author upon request. 
30 See Posner, R. (1998a), p. 155. 
31  See Cabrillo, F. (1999), p. 36-37. The theorem even holds, when one partner has an absolute advantage in the 
production of both areas. 
32 Such as Gary Becker. See Becker, G. (1993).  
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their comparative advantage initially (the couple can consume a greater amount of goods with the same level 
of input). 34 
Apparently, the gains from specialisation and forming an economic unit can also be obtained when the 
spouses only cohabitate. Yet, if one spouse specialises in household production, the existing stock of market-
related capital might depreciated and decreases the chances for a better paid job.35 Accordingly, without 
protection of the law, this might be too high a risk of dependency.  
If gender roles and biological differences were the source for the gains from marriage, homosexual would be 
less efficient when engaging in an economic unit. Biologically based comparative advantage (with women 
mainly doing household work and men engaging in the market sector) could not be exploited by same-sex 
couples. The division of labour were less intensive, and homosexual couples invested less in marital-specific 
capital.36 
2.4.6.3 The modern marriage and the gains for homosexual couples 
The optimal division of labour within the family implies that one spouse works fully in the market and the 
other working full time at home. Yet, this form of marriage with full specialisation rather resembles the form 
of marriage based on traditional gender norms. It promoted the husband’s superiority and the subordination 
of women, whose dependency was reinforced by the original responsibilities. Women were seen as wives and 
mothers devoting themselves fully to the husband and men as husbands, fathers and breadwinners. 
Since the 1960s, traditional marriage experienced a change of spousal norms, making the established believes 
of gender roles inconsistent with modern values. Marriage became more egalitarian, women too engaged in 
the labour market, improved their educational skills and thus hedged their bets on marriage while sacrificing 
gains from specialisation.37 The challenging of the traditional roles and conservative sexual morality casts not 
only doubts on the institution of marriage but also on the appropriateness of the economic modelling 
explaining the division of labour. Even though incomplete specialisation can be explained within the model 
presented above by insurance against uncertainties involved in the marriage, this implied some efficiency 
losses.  
However marriage even without full specialisation can exploit the full gains from the division of labour 
without giving up efficiency. The man need not necessarily be the main market producer, nor need the 
women be the primary household producer to realise the gains from specialisation. Further and in accordance 
with the women’s current labour market participation, it need no longer be the case that both partners differ 
33 See Posner, R. (1998a), p. 156-157. 
34 See Cabrillo, F. (1999), p. 26. 
35 This can lead to a “self-fulfilling” cycle: women anticipate that they would earn less in the market, hence they specialise 
in home-production, and invest less in market specific human capital, which further depreciates their potential market-
income. See Hersch, J. (2000), p. 3.  
36 This view is proposed by Gary Becker. See Becker, G. (1993), p. 330. However, according to neoclassical analysis gains 
from specialisation can also be explained by differences in human capital. In the next section it will show how these 
benefits can come about.  
37 The decline in the sexual division of labour was reinforced by a technological revolution that enabled women to 
control fertility, reduce the domestic tasks and increased labour force participation, See Cabrillo, F. (1993), p. 32–33. 
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in their production abilities. The specialisation can also occur, when both partners are completely identical, but 
have different endowment factors. This can be best thought of different endowments in human capital.  
Partners will specialise in the production activity they are relatively abundantly endowed with. This 
specialisation, however, is not complete. Both spouses work to some extent in both sectors.38 
This model not only provides a more appropriate description of how the division of labour actually can be 
explained (both, husband and wife share household and labour market work). It can also provide an 
explanation, why homosexual unions can gain from specialisation, even if they do not reflect the traditional, 
biologically determined gender roles that lead to the gains from specialisation.  
When specialisation is explained by biologically determined differences, same-sex marriage seems to lack 
economic justification, since gay couples are by definition biologically identical and hence none of the 
partners has an advantage in being able to bear children any better than the other. The division of labour 
seems less likely to be efficient, because neither spouse has a comparative advantage. The model just 
described on the other hand shows that even if both partners are completely identical, but only differ in their 
initial endowments, i.e. their human capital, the skills concerning the market and household work, gains from 
marriage will be realised.  
 
2.5 Differences of homosexual and heterosexual relationships 
2.5.1 Characteristics of same-sex relationships  
The law designates the benefits and burdens that promote the institution of marriage only to heterosexual 
couples. This is justified by the claim that homosexual couples differ from heterosexual couples in such an 
extent that the provisions are not appropriate for gay and lesbian unions. However same-sex couples do not 
differ significantly from opposite-sex long term partnerships in ways that are relevant for public policy. 
Furthermore, the imposed benefits and obligations from spousehood are not in any extend less applicable to 
homosexuals as they are to heterosexuals. The law protects the privacy of the marital relationship, allowing 
the partners to act as an economic unit and create obligations for mutual support. Since the law focuses on 
interpersonal commitment recognising the emotional attachment, parenting and regulating the economic 
relations between couples these regulations are also suitable for homosexual couples.  
 
2.5.2 Homosexuals and emotional bonds 
Many gays and lesbians live with long-term partners in a lasting bond, where they provide mutual care and 
support. Studies show that homo- and heterosexual relationships are very similar in nature and duration.39 
The percentage of adult gays and lesbians with partners is approximately the same as it is for heterosexuals, 
i.e. 60%.40 The great majority resemble heterosexual cohabitating couples regarding their commitment and 
assign the intimacy and economic sharing that is to be promoted by marriage. Homosexuals show no 
differences concerning love, compatibility, closeness and satisfaction in the relationship.41 Since homosexual 
38 This result comes about by applying the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade.  
39 See Eskridge, W. (1992), p. 346. 
40 See Wald, M (1999), p. 9. 
41 See Chambers, D. (1996), p. 455, and Eskridge, W. (1996), p. 109.  
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couples also cooperate economically, plan financial investments jointly and maintain a household, they can 
hardly be distinguished from heterosexual couples.   
2.5.3 Homosexuals and stability and financial resources 
Marriage law regulations are based on the underlying assumptions between one and two person households, 
i.e. that it is cheaper to live together (economies of scale), that spouses engage in a division of labour for their 
mutual benefits, and that one unit is typically dependant upon the other. Furthermore they are assumed to 
pool their financial resources.  
It is possible that homosexuals keep more financial resources separately. This however, might be due to the 
fact that the law does not secure the pooling of resources, which enhances the risk of break-up and gives rise 
to opportunistic behaviour. Hence, in protecting the relationship, the law might promote stability and the 
pooling of property. Without the backing of legal recognition, homosexual relationships might be less stable.42 
If stable relationships are regarded as valuable for society, there is a justification for the government’s 
intervention in giving homosexual partners the incentives to form stable units.  
 
2.5.4 Homosexuals and children 
Even though the current legal environment makes it difficult for homosexual couples to raise children, some 
gay and lesbian partners rear children.43 Although they cannot procreate themselves, children can either be 
adopted, obtained through artificial insemination or they might be rooted in a former heterosexual 
partnership.44 Homosexuals differ concerning procreation with heterosexuals as procreation always involves a 
third party.  
Legal protection and promotion of the family is based on the claim that children are present. However, 
numerous heterosexual couples do not intend to have children, because they are too old, they might be 
infertile or prefer not to have children. Nevertheless, they can gain from the benefits the government grants 
to them. Since it is not necessarily true that all heterosexual couples have children and it might also be 
possible that homosexuals raise children, it can be argued that these provisions should be extended to 
homosexuals since they promote investments in children and further altruism. If no legal relationship between 
the non-biological partner and a child can be established, efficient investments that benefit the child might 
not be conducted (see 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 supra). 
 
2.5.5 Homosexuals and the division of labour 
Homosexual relationships are characterised by an equal and symmetrical relationship45 with flatter hierarchies, 
more equality, a higher degree of self-determination, and better quality of social interaction. Their 
specialisation tends to depart from traditional marriage patterns. Rather than allocating all duties to one 
partner, homosexual couples tend to share them. This is also consistent with the second model of 
42 See Ressler, W. / Waters, M. (1995),  p. 579. 
43 See Eskridge, W. (1996), p. 110. 
44 Both, adoption and artificial insemination is however banned in most European countries, since governments fear the 
negative impact of homosexual parenting. See appendix for an overview.  
45 See Matthaei , J. (1997), p. 86. 
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comparative advantage. Thus, there is no indication, that same-sex couples are in any kind less efficient than 
heterosexual couples. Rather, the traditional model of division of labour might promote inequality and 
dependencies, that no longer resemble modern marriages. “The essential difference between heterosexual and 
homosexual relations is that within the homosexual network there exists no dominant model of sexual and social interaction. 
Despite prevailing stereotypes of lesbian and gay male involvement in 'role-playing', research testifies that role-playing is uncommon 
in the homosexual world... The absence of well defined roles renders moot the question of which partner will dominate, and hence, 
more equitable relations are possible since no one person's enjoyment is considered primary"46.
2.5.6 Conclusion 
The law facilitates the ability of two spouses to form a family, in which one is responsible for the other and 
can act on his behalf. It enables couples to organize their lives in ways that maximise joint well-being, 
assuming legal protection and fulfil moral obligations. The regulations are aimed to encourage long and stable 
units especially in the presence of children, that facilitate and support the decision for the commitment of 
sharing the economic lives by mutual support, joint property, joint income, and the provision of insurance, to 
enhance the emotional well-being.47 From an economic point of view, the organisation of homosexual lives 
does not differ significantly form heterosexual couples, hence if these regulations are justified by the claim to 
promote the benefits stable units provide, they are also applicable and justifiable for gay and lesbian couples.    
 
3 Marriage, cohabitation and private contracting: The alternatives to marriage 
Couples living in marriage-like unions, but do neither engage in a ceremony nor register or legally formalise 
their relationship are treated as cohabitators. They might choose to draft durable marriage-like contracts, 
which are enforced by jurisdiction. Yet, these alternatives to marriage - cohabitation and covenant contracts 
(private contracting) - might not be satisfying options for same-sex couples. Recently, governments have 
recognised the impact of non-formalised long-lasting relationships and treat cohabitating and married couples 
with respect to some purposes and legal rights alike.  
Both, private contracting and informal cohabitation offer some benefits marriage does not supply. They are 
more flexible and can be adopted in a way that suit the specific aspects of the relationship more appropriately. 
They entail less legal intervention and are associated with lower costs of exit when terminating a 
relationship.48 However, if it comes to commitment, cohabitation might be inappropriate. In order to prevent 
opportunism the parties have to draft costly contracts for significant parts of their relationships, e.g. 
concerning their property in case of dissolution, the joint assets etc.  
While contracting provides more flexibility and adaptability to the partners’ relationship as they can agree 
upon those provisions they want to be enforced and by which means they are enforced (tailoring), it can also 
resemble commitment and stability enhanced by marriage: The parties might agree that their contract is only 
46 Gottlieb, R. (1984), p. 152; citied from Bartel, R. (2000a), p. 32. 
47 See Wald, M. (1999), p. 6. 
48 See Ressler, W. / Waters, M. (1995),  p. 579. 
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terminable if special circumstances come into place.49 However, this contracting is emotionally and financially 
costly and might be detrimental for the partnership. Furthermore there are some regulations (such as 
inheritance, visitation rights etc.), that cannot be contracted privately, since they concern third parties. The 
enforcement of contracts involves court intervention, requiring that the court’s investigation in the union to 
determine whether the partners formed an emotional and financial unit and whether their relationship was 
stable and significant.50 The outcome might be long lasting and uncertain. Even though private contracting 
can overcome the problem of the appropriation of quasi-rents, it requires more planning and involves high 
transaction costs (see above).51 Lack of information and foresight may furthermore make it impossible to write 
a prenuptial marriage contract that legally binds the couple to a detailed program of behaviour through the 
coupe of marriage,52 since the partners must anticipate their well-being after the marriage. Additionally, the 
parties cannot benefit from the signalling and symbolism marriage entails. While contracts can – at least to 
some extend – replicate the provisions enhanced by marriage law, they too cannot resemble its symbolic 
character. The ceremonial act of celebration in front of the public53 and the public recognition contains 
information regarding the individual’s motivations and expectations that can neither be duplicated by 
contracting nor cohabitation. Accordingly, homosexual couples have to choose between two options that they 
might perceive inferior to marriage. Not giving the coupes the choice to marry might result in less satisfying 
and less committed relationships.54 
4 Benefits and costs of same-sex marriage  
4.1 Introduction 
The present section compares the benefits and costs of same-sex unions from an economic perspective. This 
part intends to present the arguments given in the current debate. Moral and legal positions will only be 
discussed as far as they have an economic feature, since otherwise they cannot be scientifically evaluated.  
It has been argued that homosexual and heterosexual long-term relationships do not differ to such a degree 
that would justify legal discrimination. Accordingly, homosexuals obtain similar advantages if their 
commitment is protected and recognised by the law. However, the benefits gay and lesbian couples are 
granted when their union is legally recognised greatly exceed their private benefits. They not only experience 
incentives to form a long-term union, but might also profit from a reduction in the social stigmatisation of 
homosexuality. The benefits concerning legalising same-sex marriage, which might be perceived as costs, and 
the costs, which might be perceived as benefits, will be examined simultaneously.  
 
49 See Posner, R. (1997a), p. 184. 
50 See Wald, M. (1999),  p. 15. 
51 See Eskridge, W. (1996), p. 69. 
52 See Bergstrom, T. (1996), p. 1924.  
53 See Grossbard-Shechtman, S. (1993), p. 162.  
54 See Scott, E. (2000), p. 48-49 and Posner, R. (1992), p. 311. 
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4.2 Benefit of legalising same-sex marriages 
4.2.1 Constrained choice 
Marriage is defined as a civil contract and a fundamental civil right. Individuals face a free personal choice 
with whom to spend their life and with whom to commit a long-term relationship. Denying gay and lesbian 
couples the right to contract in this way might be seen as an infringement of that freedom.55 
Individuals will decide to marry, if the benefits they expect to experience outweigh their costs. Since the 
marriage option is not available for homosexuals, they are faced with a constrained choice. Given that 
marriage between a heterosexual and a homosexual person is an imperfect substitute (if a substitute for 
homosexual relationships at all56) limiting marriage to heterosexual couples not only reduces the efficiency of 
their decision-making concerning the choice of partnership. As marriage between homosexuals and 
heterosexual partners are often unstable and likely to fail they are also detrimental for the partners and their 
children.57 Furthermore, if long-lasting and stable unions entail benefits for society as a whole, this might 
increase the inefficiency of that regulation. Besides, homosexuals might value the marriage option in itself 
even if they would not choose to marry, because of the positive external effects the recognition enhances. 
 
4.2.2 Promoting of self-esteem and happiness 
Giving same-sex couples the right to marry might increases their self-esteem.58 If homosexuals are unhappy 
because they are – by law – not allowed to form companionate marriages, that are legally and socially 
recognised, the option of engaging in same-sex marriage could contribute to their well-being.59 This is 
especially important when homosexuals marry not primarily because of the benefits granted by the 
government and their economic advantages, but because of the symbolism it reflects.60 
Often, families have difficulties in accepting the sexual orientation of the children; they are regarded as 
deviant and might be subject to family hostility. In this case, the institution of marriage might be particularly 
important for homosexuals, given that they profit from legal protection.  
 
4.2.3 Reduction of transaction costs  
Homosexual couples who are leading a long-term relationship do not face the option of formalising their 
union. This inhibits the possibility to take advantage of the standard form contract that guarantees the 
spouses a packet of rights they can accept when deciding to marry. Some of the benefits can be procured by 
other methods such as trust and durable powers of attorneys and wills.61 Yet, legal assistance to set private 
contracts (see 4.2 and 4.3) is necessary, which result in significant transaction costs in attorneys’ fees for legal 
documents to protect the relationship, property and children. Private contracting might not even be an option 
55 See Bartel, R. (2000a), p. 34. 
56 See Lauw, I. (1994), p. 6.  
57 See Lauw, I. (1994), p. 6. 
58 See Posner, R. (1992), p. 311.  
59 This claim, that homosexual are more likely to be unhappy compared to heterosexual couples, is not necessarily true, 
see Eskridge, W. (1992), p. 364. 
60 See Chambers, D. (1996), p. 450. 
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for low-income couples. Those entitlements for which contractual provisions is inhibited by prohibitively 
high transaction costs (such as the right to hospital visitation or medical decisions for an incapacitated spouse, 
the creation of a legal family relationship for inheritance and other purposes) enhance the effect.62 
Accordingly, the provision of legal restrictions reduces bargaining and transaction costs and avoids inefficient 
outcomes that might occur if one partner failed to take precautionary measures because of ignorance.  
The savings in transaction costs are dependant on how well the rules are tailored for marital relations.63 Some 
of these savings will get lost, when people have to bargain around inappropriate rules, on which traditional 
marriage law is based. Given that homosexuals are financially more independent and their roles in the 
household are more equally distributed, the traditional standard family policy might be unsuitable for them. 64 
Yet, they are also for opposite-sex couples, who lead a modern way of life. The possibility to provide different 
contractual provisions or protections by separate forms of marriage for homosexual and heterosexual couples 
can avoid ill-fitting regulations. This benefits all those couples, who do no longer follow the traditional 
pattern of marriage, independently of their sexual orientation.65 
4.2.4 Venereal diseases and AIDS 
If homosexuals and bisexuals are regarded as a major source for the transmission of venereal diseases, such as 
AIDS, the spreading of the infection might be cured by supporting durable monogamous unions. 
Homosexual promiscuity might be trimmed down, which in turn reduces the spread of venereal diseases.66 
Furthermore, if a recognition of same-sex marriage diminished the social stigma of homosexuality, gays and 
lesbians might no longer be inclined to cluster in cities. Homosexuals tend to concentrate in cities to reduce 
their search costs. The concentration of potential infective population can accelerate the spread of diseases by 
increasing the number of persons confronted with it. Accordingly, same-sex marriage might reduce the risk of 
the transmission of venereal diseases by both, promoting sexual faithfulness, and by reducing the incentive to 
cluster in cities.67 
Furthermore, the social insurance function of marriage bonds is especially important for the people infected 
with AIDS. The commitment to another partner is more effective for those contaminated, since they require 
psychical and emotional support. Bringing people together and cementing the relationships rather than toring 
them apart will benefit the partners as well as society by further decreasing health expenses.68 
61 See Lauw, I. (1994), p. 4. 
62 See Badgett, M. (1996), p. 2. 
63 See Buckley, F./ Ribstein, L. (2000), p. 19. 
64 This is attenuated if homosexuals are less likely to demand sexual fidelity, the more difficult it is to introduce fault in 
divorce. Moreover, they are frequently characterised by higher financial independency, which requires different 
inheritance rules.   
65 Some governments have already recognised the need to offer different provisions for various long-term 
relationships. Hence they enforced regulations with respect to marriage, cohabitation and domestic partnerships. See 
appendix for an overview of the regulations with respect to homosexual couples in Europe. 
66 See Posner, R. (1997b), p. 175. 
67 This would also result in a decrease of health expenses associated with curbing the virus. See Posner, R. (1997b), p. 
178. 
68 See Eskridge, W. (1996), p. 58.  
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4.2.5 Reduction of the costs of discrimination  
The current legal and social environment (still) assigns significant disadvantages for homosexuals regardless of 
whether the society is tolerant or intolerant of homosexuals. Homosexual couples are not only discriminated 
against married couples, but mostly also against heterosexuals living in cohabitation. They are discriminated in 
the workplace and have problems with being recognised as equal citizens.  
Legal recognition of same-sex marriage might contribute to support societal approval and hence reduce 
discrimination against homosexuals. As long as homosexual relationships are subject to stigmatisation and 
discrimination, gays and lesbians cannot fully realise the potential satisfaction of a union.   
Homosexuals can either chose to comply with the norms69 in passing as a heterosexual and marrying 
somebody of the opposite sex or fully abstaining from marriage. Choosing a closeting strategy to avoid the 
prejudices adhering to homosexuality (harassment, violence and discrimination) and leading a double life, 
causes psychical and economic costs. Trying to pass as heterosexuals influences the quality of life and triggers 
physical effort and stress while reducing the performance and efficiency in the workplace. Furthermore 
homosexuals incur high transaction costs for concealing their same-sex orientation in the family and the 
workplace, but at the same time enjoying the life in the queer community.70 These costs are a social waste 
since they are devoted to unproductive activities.  
Abolishing discrimination with the help of legalising same-sex marriage will lead to a channelling of resources 
into more productive uses. This promotes efficiency, since it furthers economic growth, hence benefiting 
society as a whole. Social integration is likely to enhance social welfare for the reason that the more equitable 
the benefits of social and economic development are distributed, the better the quality of life.71 
4.2.6 Stability of unions and stability of society – a benefit or a cost?  
4.2.6.1 Same-sex marriage as a means to promote the stability of couples  
The informational value inherent in marriage - divorce obligations make it costly to get out of - signal 
commitment and enhance stability.72 The protection and support by the government would give homosexuals 
the incentives to engage in unions that involve sharing, division of labour, foster marriage specific 
investments and joint property, involve children and enhance risk pooling, implicit insurance and support. 
Additionally, if homosexuals (especially gay men) were more promiscuous – they are often assumed to have a 
preference for a greater sexual variety - this might result in less stable relationship. Marriage then could 
encourage monogamy in providing more discipline for faithfulness73 and could contribute to more stable 
relationships.74 This, in turn, might reduce the incidence of venereal diseases such as AIDS, as discussed in 
section 4.2.4 above.  
69 See Escoffier, J. (1997), p. 126-131, Bartel, R. (2000a), p. 14, 40-50.  
70 See Bartel, R. (2000a), p. 62-63. 
71 See Bartel, R. (2000a), p. 16-17. 
72 See Wald, M. (1999), p. 10-11.  
73 See Eskridge, W. (1996), p. 83 
74 This is also supported by Krudek, L. (1998), who conducted a study with regard to the relationships of heterosexual 
married, gay cohabitating, and lesbian cohabitating couples. See also Anderson, R. (1993),  p. 197, Ressler, R./ Waters, M. 
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Yet, also the society benefits from the promotion of social, emotional and economic stability of the partners 
and their families. Married couples might be more productive, more involved in their community, and less 
likely to be dependant on social programs.75 Accordingly, if family stability is considered as a public good that 
benefits the society, there is a point for the government to intervene and promote stability in order to avoid 
an undersupply, that might occur with free contracting.76 
4.2.6.2 Same-sex marriage as a threat for the stability of society? 
Same-sex marriage might have unpredictable effects on the institution of marriage. Allowing homosexuals to 
engage in matrimony could be regarded as a threat to marriage as it opens the door for all kinds of 
relationships. The change of marriage could undermine its stability, since heterosexuals might lose the respect 
not only for marriage but also for the law. However, the legalising of same-sex marriage does not necessarily 
imply that all kinds of marriages will be allowed.77 Furthermore the destabilisation argument can be rejected 
by the insignificant amount of those same-sex couples that seek to marry (see also 4.3.3 infra). Compared to all 
marriages, they are unlikely to make up a large proportion of total marriages.  
 
4.2.7 The promotion of equality – a benefit or a cost?   
It might be argued that homosexual household structures entail a loss in productivity, income and utility, since 
they do not follow the established role models that are promoted by the law. Traditional marriage law is based 
on gender roles that encourage comparative advantages and a division of labour assuming that the men is 
breadwinner-boss and the woman the housekeeper-child bearer by nature.78 The different roles of men and 
women are traced back to biological differences. Since homosexuals do not differ in their production abilities 
for household and market production, it seems economically unjustified to protect same-sex unions. 
However, not only does the traditional model of comparative advantage reinforce the male’s superiority and 
inequality between the sexes, where the wife’s dependency causes economic, psychological and physical 
vulnerability and contributes to the women’s inequality of opportunities and power in society.79 Furthermore, 
as has been shown in chapter 3, different production technologies might not be the only reason to gain from 
the division and specialisation of labour. Even when the couple is completely identical, those benefits can be 
generated, hence homosexual households can be as efficient as heterosexual ones.80 
(1995), Horne, P. (1994), p. 25. According to Posner, however, stability might be only marginally increased. See Posner 
(1993), p. 311.  
75 See Horne, P. (1994), p. 25. 
76 See Cabrillo, F. (1999), p. 73. 
77 With polygamous marriage, e.g. partners are unlikely to be able to fulfil their economic obligations, intimacy and 
emotional growth. This makes it a doubtful arrangement to be protected by the government, see Wald, M. (1999), p. 14. 
78 See Matthaei, J. (1997), p. 139-146. 
79 See Matthaei, J. (1997), p. 140-141, Bartel, R. (2000a), p. 84-87.   
80 See Eskridge, W. (1996), p. 118. 
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Recognizing any marriage will alter its major functions.81 Gay and lesbian families can serve as a model of 
parenthood and equality, as the traditional division of labour is less likely to occur.82 Same-sex family models 
give more freedom to organize the lives together, and more opportunity in an egalitarian way. Their 
relationship is characterised by flatter hierarchies, they promote a better quality of social interaction and 
prevent adverse side-effects of traditional marriage.83 This equality in the relationship due to equivalent 
partners would not decrease efficiency.84 
4.3 The costs of legalising same-sex marriage 
4.3.1 Tradition and informational costs  
The nature of marriage and its historical interpretation, even if the definition of marriage itself is gender 
neutral, determine it to be a union between men and women.85 Accordingly, marriage for same-sex couples 
would be contradicting in terms and would obscure the informational value it enhances. The more broadly 
marriage is defined, the less information is revealed. However, it might be argued that marriage has not been a 
union defined to be exclusively for opposite-sex couples. Homosexual marriage has occurred in Christian and 
non-Christian societies.86 
Recognising same-sex marriage is a change in one of the major social institutions. Accordingly, tradition 
should give a halt before welcoming a radical change, since the fact that something has worked out over a 
long period indicates its usefulness and rises the question about the merits of what it replaces (costs of 
uncertainty).87 But tradition strengthens the conservative position and there is no reason to reject a proposal 
for change. As homosexuals, who are as successful in leading long-term relationships as heterosexuals do, and 
who are unlikely to reveal differences regarding trust, commitment and love, there is no rationale for the 
reluctance to recognise their bonds. The society is subject to changes in values and there is no indication 
whether the prevailing definition of marriage is correct. Marriage may not necessarily be a union between men 
and women but is a socially and politically created institution that serves political and social functions. 
 
4.3.2 Over-signalling 
Marriage with its entailed consequences is useful as a screening device: The obligations associated with it 
provide an effective selection mechanism to distinguish the relationships that are committing and long lasting 
81 The argumentation must be regarded with a caveat in mind. The view that social institutions determine the position of 
individuals in society and that heterosexuality is a cause for patriarchy that determines the division of labour is based on a 
Marxistic-feministic view of society. This view is strictly opposed to traditional neoclassical theory on which the present 
analysis is based. See Cabrillo, F. (1999), p. 9.  
82 See Moller Okin, S. (1997), p. 54. 
83 i.e. the uneven power that occurs in heterosexual relationships, that are based on the assumption that the 
man is the dominant partner. See Moller Okin, S. (1997), p. 54-57. 
84 See Bartel, R. (2000a), p. 34. 
85 See Lauw, I. (1994),  p. 4, and Eskridge, W. (1996), p. 89. 
86 See Lauw, I. (1994), p. 4, Eskridge, W. (1996), p. 15-50, and Posner, R. (1992), pp. 37, and Posner, R. (1998b), p. 577. 
Eskridge gives an extensive overview of the history of same-sex marriage and argues that – in contrast to modern 
Western cultures, that are peculiarly hostile towards same-sex unions, they have been accepted and approved in ancient 
civilisations and non-Western cultures (e.g. ancient Greece, Rome,  Egypt and Canaan, Native America, Africa, and Asia, 
and even the medieval Church).   
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from those that are not.88 Yet, legalising homosexual marriage results in a split of “good” and “bad” 
homosexuals.89 The availability of legally sanctioned unions will motivate some couples to seek social, cultural 
and legal acceptance (good homosexuals), who will signal their reliability as marriage partners. However, it 
might lead some couples to over-commit to avoid undermining the partner’s trust. Partners realise that not 
being willing to marriage would give a signal of lack of reliability (bad homosexuals).90 Although both might 
prefer cohabitation they convey a stronger signal and chose to marry than they would normally wish to send.  
The over-signalling problem might be higher for homosexuals, if they have the option to marry, because they 
have not had this opportunity.  
Whether the possibility of over-signalling is problematic, is difficult to verify. Yet, the costs of over-signalling 
must be weighted against the benefits of commitment it reflects.91 
4.3.3 Publicity 
Marriage is a matter of public record. If gay and lesbian couples are still in the closet about their sexual 
orientation – e.g. because of the fear of parental disapproval or discrimination on the job, marriage might 
cause unwelcome inquiries.92 But marriage is a choice, that a couple faces. If the perceived costs are too high, 
the couple will prefer to remain single or cohabitate. 
 
4.3.4 Stamp of approval 
The recognition of same-sex marriage requires that the society not only admits that gays and lesbians do have 
a continuing relationship, but would also place a social valuation on these bonds. Hence the government is in 
the position of propagating and privileging homosexuality.93 Yet, there is a difference between respecting a 
right to engage in a same-sex relationships and endorsing marriage between gay couples. Privileging gay and 
lesbians might not be a feasible proposal since in recognising same-sex marriage the government signals that 
homosexuality is accepted and beneficial. However, the government does not privilege homosexuals in 
recognising their long-term relationship, but rather give them equal rights, whose discrimination can hardly be 
justified. Those, that have been repressed and refrained from coming out – which was associated with 
significant costs (see 4.2.5 supra), can lead an unconstrained life, which is beneficial. 
 
4.3.5 Negative externalities 
When homosexuals are granted the marriage option, they might come out of the closet and will show their 
sexual affection in public. This might be regarded as a negative externality that is imposed on some people, 
87 See Buckley, F.H./ Ribstein, L. (2000), p. 19.  
88 See Anderson, R. (1992), p. 197.  
89 See Lauw, I. (1994), p. 7. 
90 In order to avoid a “pooling-equilibrium”, where all partners - even those, who do not have serious intentions - 
choose the same strategy (i.e. to marry), and in order to secure the reputational benefits from marriage, the signal must 
be sufficiently costly. If the signal is perceived as costly by less committed types and only those with the most serious 
intentions choose to send this signal, it stigmatises those who do not choose marriage (bad homosexuals). See Scott, E. 
(2000), p. 52. 
91 See Buckley, F.H./ Ribstein, L. (2000), p. 16.  
92 See Eskridge, W. (1996), p. 71. 
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who feel offended and disgusted. Even though sexual orientation and relations are a matter of privacy, they 
are a public issue since they cannot be concealed totally effectively.94 Yet, these negative value judgements can 
only be changed if the attitudes towards homosexuals and the acceptance of their orientation change. This 
might be achieved with the legal recognition of gay and lesbian partnerships.  
 
4.3.6 The argument of procreation 
If the legitimate (traditional) purpose of marriage is understood as to channel procreation by guaranteeing 
stable units and to defend family values, same-sex marriage might be perceived as costly and inconsistent with 
marriage itself. Furthermore, it might be argued that each individual in society has a responsibility for future 
generations, i.e. there is a duty on living persons to bear and rear additional human beings who are capable of 
getting satisfaction, adding to social welfare.95 
Family policies that grant benefits to couples in order to promote reproduction are a cost for the government, 
yet they would not be accompanied with the intended consequences. Since homosexuals cannot procreate, 
they not only lack fulfilling their duty, they also create expenses that might be seen as a waste. However, 
procreation is not the foundation of marriage although it is of great importance for many couples who are 
married or consider to marry. Matrimony is not only available for couples capable of procreation and 
childbearing is not a necessary condition for being allowed to marry. Besides, even if homosexuals couples 
cannot have babies themselves, many wish to raise families and could theoretically do so by artificial 
insemination and adoption, though this is frequently difficult because of legislative barriers (see also 2.5.4).  
 
4.3.7 Effect on Children  
Children are the most important marriage-specific investments and frequently the main reason why couples 
decide to marry. They are their strongest cement and valuable for society as a whole. Objections against 
legalising same-sex marriage are often based upon the concern that homosexual parents impose negative 
externalities on their children. It is claimed, that homosexual relations are less long-lasting as heterosexual 
ones which is more disruptive for children. Moreover, two opposite sex partners as role models would be 
necessary to raise children successfully.96 Furthermore, children brought up in a homosexual household are 
more likely to develop a homosexual orientation.97 
Since children are incapable of caring for themselves and they cannot make reliable contractual agreements 
for their own benefits with their caretakers, the government seeks to protect and prevent them, especially if 
harmful effects of parents on children are expected.  
Recognising gay and lesbian unions is, however, rather beneficial than detrimental for the parties involved.98 
Children would benefit from marriage and the establishment of a legal relationship with the non-biological 
93 See Posner, R. (1992), p. 311-312. 
94 See Bartel, R. (2000a), p. 61. 
95 See Bartel (2000b), p. 13.  
96 See Wald, M. (1999),  p. 12.  
97 This last aspect is discussed in section 5.3.8. 
98 See Kovacs, K. (1995), p. 39. 
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parent. In fostering proximity, altruism and enhancing the stability of the relationship the economic interest of 
the adolescent is protected.99 
If the non-biological parent knows that the investments made are secured by the law, he/ she has greater 
incentives to invest in the child. Furthermore, children who live with a stepparent or a non-biological parent 
who is in a committed relationship with the biological parent will mostly become attached to and financially 
dependent on him/ her. When the biological parent dies and the partner might be unable to adopt and raise 
the child even if he/ she has taken a parental function for him/ her, this will neither be in the interest of the 
child nor of the surviving partner.  
There is no empirical evidence supporting the claim that homosexual partners do have a negative impact on 
the child’s development.100 Children raised by homosexual couples develop just as well as those brought up by 
heterosexual parents.101 As long as it cannot be proven that children need parents of both sexes as role models 
to be raised successfully, there seems to be no justification for concern of homosexual parenting. Yet, the 
assertions of the studies should not be overemphasised. Even though they might present consistent findings, 
the samples are not randomly chosen and might reflect biased results, hence not giving an appropriate picture 
about the influence of homosexuals on their children.102 
Nevertheless, the difficulties children raised in homosexual relationships may well be caused by the 
stigmatisation of their homosexual parents. Legal recognition could help to change people’s attitudes, corrode 
prejudices and further acceptance that also helps the children. Furthermore, it remains questionable what 
harms the child more: to take it away from the biological, homosexual parent and give it to the partner, who 
might be less devoted to the child, or to let it be raised in a homosexual relationship. Being a good parent is 
dependant on a large variety of factors and is not dependant on the sexual orientation.103 
Also, if society accepts homosexual relationships as valid and digit unions, this had the additional benefit that 
fewer parents would reject their gay children. However, as long as representative, unbiased, and non-
contradictory scientific evidence about the impact of homosexual parenting is missing, gay and lesbians will 
face difficulties in raising children. 
 
4.3.8 The effect on population 
The approval of homosexual couples might be rejected by the claim that its protection and promotion results 
in a higher homosexual population.104 Yet, sexual orientation is genetic and cannot or only with significant 
99 See Chambers, D. (1996), p. 461.  
100 See Wald, M. (1999), p. 12, and Lauw, I. (1994), p. 5-6. 
101 See Wald, M. (1999),  p. 11. 
102 The lack of empirical studies is based on the current regulations, that mostly make it impossible for homosexual 
couples to adopt children. As long as society fears negative influence of gay and lesbian parenting, however, the 
restriction will prevail, hence also limit the studies that give an appropriate scientific statement.  
103 Allowing homosexual couples to adopt children might also help single women or men to adopt, since it helps to 
remove the assertion that it needs two persons of the opposite sex  to raise a child adequately.  
104 If homosexuals are not allowed to procreate artificially, then this might result in a lower population growth, which can 
be seen as costly, if society wishes to increase the birth rate. See Cabrillo, F. (1999), pp. 134.   
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psychological costs be changed.105 If a homosexual is someone with a homosexual orientation rather than a 
person with a heterosexual one, who may happen to have engaged in homosexual activity (i.e. a opportunistic 
homosexual), the number of homosexuals is invariant to public policy. Homosexuality is not chosen, although 
there are choices made as to lifestyle (e.g. either closet or openly gay). The concern then, that some teenagers 
might adopt homosexuality can be rejected. Also, the claim that children are more likely to engage in 
homosexual behaviour if raised by homosexual parents cannot be supported empirically.106 Hence, allowing 
gay and lesbian couples to marry will not lead to a change in preferences, only change in behaviour through 
legal regulation, since homosexual behaviour is a choice that can be influenced by the law and public opinion. 
107 
4.3.9 Costs imposed to employers and the government  
4.3.9.1 Costs for enterprises by employment benefits  
When marriage is extended to same-sex couples, private and public employers are forced to reassess 
employment-, health- and other benefits to homosexual partners. This requires to determine a scheme that is 
economically efficient and confers benefits to all married parties. Since the employer cannot through an 
adjustment of wages or other means make each worker pay for his/ her own benefits, these payments may be 
regarded as a cost for society.108 These costs nevertheless are unlikely to be substantial. Some employers have 
already recognised that those living with long-term partners face similar family-life-concerns to married 
couples and require similar compensation packages. Furthermore, they might also use those domestic 
partnership benefits to attract and retain productive workers when the labour market is tight.109 
Also, the increase in health care expenses, which make up a large part of the labour costs, might not be 
significant. This is caused by the fact, that only a small amount of gay and lesbian people have not yet been 
enrolled, because it is more likely that both partners are engaged in the labour market. Hence, the availability 
of employment fringe benefits will rather result in a shifting of costs from one employer to the other than 
increase the total amount of costs. The remaining costs due to higher benefit payments are likely to be small, 
since the homosexual population is small.110 Furthermore, the denial of rights based on sexual preferences is a 
discrimination and cannot be justified on economic grounds (equal pay for equal work).111 
105 See Haldeman, D. (1999). Many interventions aimed at changing sexual orientation have succeeded only in reducing or 
eliminating homosexual behaviour rather than in creating or increasing heterosexual attractions. They have, in effect, 
deprived individuals of their capacity for sexual response to others, see Herek, G. (2001). 
106 See Wald, M. (1999), p. 9. 
107 See Posner, R. (1997a), p. 1583-84.  
108 See Posner, R. (1997a), p. 1581.  
109 See Bartel. R. (2000a), p. 51. 
110 See Badgett, M.V. (2000), who calculated health care benefits for domestic partners. She comes to the result that 
offering health care benefits to domestic partners is not a costly proposition for employers and results to at most a 1%- 
2% increase in costs, when coverage is offered to same-sex and opposite sex partners.  
111 See Posner, R. (1992), p. 313, and Lauw, I. (1994), p. 7.  
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4.3.9.2 Costs for the government  
Legal recognition of same-sex unions might be financially costly to the government.112 If the granting of tax 
breaks and legal benefits results in an increase in the expenses for the government that is not accompanied 
with benefits for society and if there are no additional benefits that could justify these expenses, the 
administration should have an interest to limit same-sex marriage.  
The overall fiscal impact on the federal budget is dependant on several factors such as the number of 
marriages of homosexual couples, which will result in benefits and costs, those that will only get a license by 
travelling to the country (they might rather increase the revenues because of tourist expenses),113 and the 
financial benefits and costs for the government that are associated with marriage.  
The main financial benefit for the state includes the decrease in social service programs (expenditures for 
means-tested assistance programs (anti-poverty support programs)). Since the government has constructed a 
safety net that catches individuals when the family can no longer provide them with housing, food, health 
care, financial misfortune and death or unemployment, the employed or financially able spouse is obliged to 
contribute to maintain the family. As the family support of the spouses lifts the partner out of eligibility of the 
programs, the financial burden caused by supplemental security income, medical care, etc. imposed on the 
state will be reduced. These savings for the government are likely to be large.114 
Costs on the other hand are caused by marital exemptions on taxes for gifts and inheritance and joint income 
tax receipts, state employee benefits, and access to courts. When the joint income tax burden of married 
couples falls short of the their combined tax liabilities as single filers, the couple experiences a marriage 
subsidy. Families with two-earners however, are unlikely to receive this subsidy. Since same-sex couples are 
more likely to be two-earner couples, legalising same-sex marriage might not increase the federal budget. The 
decrease in government revenues due to marital tax exemptions is unlikely to make up a large amount, since 
wealthy couples usually find ways to engage in estate tax planning or other means to minimise their taxation. 
As has been argued above, the increase in fringe benefits might not be large either. Finally juridical cost due to 
court access also occur if there is private contracting, hence they will not be avoided. 
Calculating the effect on the government’s budget is a precarious exercise. The lack of data on the size of the 
homosexual population willing to marry, their income, the impact on social security etc., makes a precise 
estimation impossible. A generalisation of some studies indicating, that same-sex marriage rather has a 
beneficial financial impact on the federal budget115 might be too hasty an attempt. Yet, as has been argued 
above, the total impact on the budget is unlikely to be substantial, since the decrease in tax revenues is likely 
to be smaller than the savings in expenses for support programs.   
 
112 See Badgett, M.V. (1996), p. 1, and Kubasek, N./ Jennings, K./ Browne, S. (1997),  p.11.  
113 In order to avoid an inflow of same-sex couples travelling to other countries to marry and then returning to their 
home states to live as married couples as prompted the Danish government to limit the marriage license to Danish 
citizens (see appendix).    
114 See Badgett, M.V. (1996), and Badgett, M.V. (1998). 
115 See Badgett, M.V. (1996) and (1998). In the US the beneficial effect might be even larger because the marriage 
partners might be subject to the so called marriage penalty, that occurs if both partners fill the tax receipts jointly. See 
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4.4 Weighting the benefits against the costs 
When deciding about the desirability of same-sex marriage, the benefits of legalising have to be contrasted 
with the costs involved. In the third part it has been shown that marriage enhances the private benefits of the 
spouses that decide to engage in a legally formalised unions. If couples had a choice between marrying and 
cohabitation, they would choose to tie the knot only if their perceived benefits the marriage entails outweigh 
the costs116 it implies. The possibility to marry would allow homosexual couples to benefit from a reduction 
of transaction costs due to the standard form contract marriage law provides, they would have an free choice 
to decide how to arrange their partnerships, the commitment given to each other could result in greater 
satisfaction, happiness and altruism, and would give incentives for efficient relationship-specific investments.  
Yet, marriage not only does good to private parties, but is beneficial for society as a whole. If the recognition 
helps to overcome prejudices and the stigmatisation of homosexuality, these gains are accompanied with the 
positive externality of reduced discrimination, accompanied with increasing self-esteem, diminishing 
psychological and economic costs, higher productivity and economic growth. The promotion of monogamy 
and sexual fidelity could reduce the risk of spreading venereal diseases, which would reduce health-
expenditures. If same-sex marriage helps to reform marriage law, traditional gender norms could be 
abandoned and women might be able to make up their weaker position in matrimony.  
Hence, there are strong economic arguments for the recognition of same-sex marriage. Contrasting them with 
the costs of legalising same-sex marriage, indicates that there might be hardly a ground for protecting the 
status quo. None of the costs are likely to weigh substantial. Same-sex marriage might be a means to defeat 
traditional values and laws that are no longer suitable for the modern society, the negative externalities might 
be overthrown when acceptance increases. Also the financial costs for either employers or the government are 
unlikely to be high: Even if expenditures might increase slightly, extending benefits to homosexuals could be 
profitable employers, because the create a satisfied workforce. The government might experience a decrease 
in health expenditures and support payments, that can outweigh the costs created by lower tax revenues. Also 
the fears of negative effects on the population, be it children or the amount of heterosexuals, can be rejected. 
Neither is it plausible to expect a higher homosexual population when same-sex marriage is legalised, nor can 
harmful effects of homosexual parenting be support empirically. Legal protection might actually be positive 
for children and their parents, since it furthers altruism and investments.  
Albeit these assertions, however, the argument of potential harmful effects on children remains a powerful 
one. This is especially so, since society has an interest in children, and many governments try to promote 
childrearing by pro-natalist policies.117 Yet, it might be the stigmatisation of homosexual attitudes and the 
accompanied social exclusion and harassment in everyday life that hurt children more than homosexual 
parenting. A final conclusion might be too early to draw. Yet, a family relationship, is neither dependant on 
children nor on procreation, but rather the commitment and the financial and emotional interdependence of 
Alm, J./ Badgett, L./ Whittington, L. (2000). In countries with constitutional protection of the marriage, this marriage 
tax does not occur.  
116 such as financial obligations, reduced sexual variance etc. 
117 See, for example, Cabrillo, F. (1999), pp. 134. 
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the couple. When a community refuses to recognise and protect the promises made by its members, the state 
acts against society’s interest, because of the positive effect it enhances.118 
Even if a contrasting of benefits and costs indicates that total welfare would be increased, by allowing 
marriage to homosexual couples, some caution has to be kept in mind: Reforming an institution that carries a 
meaning which is so heavily infused with tradition, history and religion, might cause distrust in the law and 
increases the negative attitudes associated with marriage. The potential positive effects that might be 
connected with the recognition might not materialise. Instead of enhancing stability and well-being of 
homosexuals, the change in law could have significant drawbacks and might even decrease the acceptance of 
their way of life. If people feel offended by their coming out and the invalidation of traditional family values, 
the change might run in the “wrong” direction. Instead of more acceptance, legal change might result in 
unrest and distrust in the law and the institution of marriage. This might come about even though the 
homosexual population itself is small.  
When advancing a reform, this threat has to be taken into account. Whether attitudes towards homosexuals 
will change in a positive or negative way, is an empirical question. As the experience in the Netherlands, 
Denmark, and Sweden shows, social acceptance may well increase. This is crucially dependant on how the 
governments implement the change. The last part will argue how and whether change is necessary and 
appropriate.   
 
5 The way ahead: Arguments for social change 
5.1 Introduction 
Traditionally marriage has been understood to be a union of one man and one women. It is still accompanied 
with ideals and principles the society sees as valuable. However, the internalised roles and rigid social 
structures seem to be comparatively unapt for copying with the novel societal developments such as striving 
for freedom and self-determination especially through the rising equality in marriage relationships.119 The 
different types of families be they homosexual, heterosexual, singles with children etc. require a change in 
socially determined family values, which in turn entail a modification of the legislation. Yet, the society might 
be trapped in an inefficient equilibrium. People might be unwilling to expand marriage to homosexual couples 
unless the courts or the parliament redefines it. But then again courts and parliament might be reluctant to 
introduce a change unless society accepts that gay and lesbian couples are capable of living in partnerships 
that qualify for protection.120 Thus, even if a change, that frees the indoctrinated forms of sexual expressions 
and promotes sexual diversity, would be welfare improving as it may well reduces both, the discrimination 
against women in heterosexual relationships and the one against gay and lesbians it might not come into 
place.121 
This inefficiency is augmented by the fact that the laws protecting marriage are a means to preserve the status 
quo. It enjoys a presumptive political legitimacy since it is assumed to be based on consent and in conditions 
118 See Nicholson, A. (1996), p. 6. 
119 See Bartel, R. (2000a), p. 29. 
120 See Lauw, I. (1994), p. 5.   
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of uncertainty it seems safest to do nothing. Accordingly, it might be implicitly agreed not to touch the critical 
and tabooed issue of same-sex orientation, given that the consequences of a change cannot be foresee.122 
Nevertheless, some governments have recognised that society and the institution of marriage is subject to 
change. They have tackled the issue of new family structures and have prepared legal proposals how to adopt 
to the change. Some of these plans have already come into force.  
This section discusses the suitability, the possibilities and the effects of social change. As the preceding 
analysis has shown, the benefits associated with a change in legal regulation are likely to exceed the costs. 
Hence, it will be shown on which claim a legal change can be implemented.  
 
5.2 The role of legislation 
Anti-homosexual attitudes are neither immutable nor universal. Sexual norms evolved because of cultural 
values. They have been created by social arrangements which are currently in a process of change. In 
approving same-sex relationships the law might help to overcome the prejudices and the stigma of 
homosexuals on the one hand and weaken the sacramental value associated with marriage on the other.123 
Legislation might be the only way to change the reserving and rejecting attitudes regarding homosexuals and 
pave the way towards full social acceptance.124 This can shape the preferences and publicise a new consensus 
about desirable behaviour.125 
The success of legal reform might depend upon the coincidence between the legal prescriptions and the 
community opinion. If legal initiatives deviate substantially from community consensus it is unlikely that they 
have an impact on the target norm, hence prejudices and stigma in society might prevail.126 Thus, it is 
important to create a social climate to send signals to the public and make people change their minds. 
Jurisdiction can signal, create or reinforce social trends. The judicial and political efforts to open up marriage 
and domestic partnerships attack some of the homophobic assumptions that can lead to an increase in the 
willingness to admit a positive value in intimate same-sex relationships.  
 
5.3 Erroneous information  
The prohibition of same-sex marriage is based upon an anti-homosexual assertion according to which gay and 
lesbian sexuality is perceived as a distorted status. Yet, the sexual orientation is not a rational basis upon 
which to exclude homosexuals form society.127 The judgements about homosexuals as deviants and 
homosexuality as a mental illness are based on a lack of knowledge.128 In order to implement a successful 
social change and achieve societal appropriation, it is necessary to provide people with information to 
121 See Bartel, R. (2000a), p. 35.  
122 See Bartel, R. (2000b), p. 3-4. 
123 See Buckley, F.H./ Ribstein, L. (2000), p. 23 
124 See Bartel, R. (2000a), p. 36, and Bartel, R. (2000b), p. 16. 
125 See Scott, E. (2000), p. 26. 
126 See Scott, E. (2000), p. 60. 
127 See Eskridge, W. (1992), p. 367. The assertion that homosexuality is a pathological illness is a reflection of social 
prejudices. Yet, there is no significant difference between homosexuals and heterosexuals on measures of overall 
psychological functioning and mental and emotional well-being. See Haldemen, D. (1999), p. 1, and Herek, G. (2001). 
128 See Eskridge, W. (1992), p. 363. 
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overcome these prejudices. The society has to be convinced that homosexuality cannot be suppressed or 
changed and that compulsion to conceal the sexual preference produces negative externalities.129 Since 
negative attitudes and feelings can be expected to deteriorate as soon as personal relationships with 
homosexuals are developed, it might be necessary to confront heterosexuals with same-sex couples.  
 
5.4 Social change and the Pareto-criterion 
According to the Pareto-criterion a change in the law, regulations or norms is efficient, if it is Pareto-
improving. Pareto-efficiency is achieved in a situation where it is impossible to make somebody better off 
while making nobody worse off. If the law is altered in a way that reduces the oppressive social climate and 
relieves gays and lesbians being subject to suppressive laws, stigmatisation and social exclusion,130 this will lead 
to a Pareto-improvement: The legalisation of same-sex marriage and its associated effect on the treatment of 
homosexuals by a reduction in discrimination does not decrease the welfare of heterosexuals: their rights and 
benefits are not taken apart. Yet, it makes the homosexual community in general and gay and lesbian couples 
in particular better off: The social integration and the legal recognition of same-sex relationships produce a 
higher life quality of gays and lesbians and increases their self-esteem, helps to abolish prejudices in society 
and increases the equality in marriage.  
The separation of private and public life by concealing and camouflaging the sexual orientation (e.g. by 
marrying someone of the opposite sex), the repression of sexual preferences and desires, remaining in the 
closet and the obstacles involved with realising stable sexual and emotional relationships not only impose 
psychological and economic costs, but also costs on society as a whole.131 Thus, abolishing the societal 
repression and simultaneously reducing the costs of freely showing the sexual orientation increases 
productivity, which has been reduced due to the concealing and suppression of the sexual preference. This 
enhances overall welfare because resources are channelled into more productive uses.  
However, it might be argued, that some heterosexuals will feel disturbed by homosexuals, who show their 
affection in public (negative externality). They might find same-sex orientation unacceptable, immoral or even 
disgusting from their perception of family values. Then the Pareto-improvement might be too strong a 
requirement when deciding about the appropriateness of legalising same-sex marriage since losers could veto 
a change.132 
5.5 The status quo and Kaldor-Hicks 
According to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion a change of the current legislation is efficient, when the material and 
immaterial gains outweigh the losses associated with it. Kaldor-Hicks compensation enables an improvement 
129 This is particularly likely when attempts are made to change sexual orientation with conversion therapies. See 
Haldeman, D. (1999), p. 3. "The potential risks of 'reparative therapy' are great, including depression, anxiety and self-destructive 
behavior, since therapist alignment with societal prejudices against homosexuality may reinforce self-hatred already experienced by the patient." 
See Herek, G. (2001). 
130 Social exclusion has not been taken account of in economic theory. Yet, this influences the individual’s and society’s 
welfare.  
131 See 5.2.5, and Escoffier, J. (1997), p. 130.  
132 See Cooter, R. / Ulen, T. (2000),  p. 42-43. 
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of a situation if the winners win more than the losers loose, i.e. if the winners could hypothetically buy off the 
losers and the winners would still benefit. Consequently, even if the negative externality produces some costs 
for the heterosexual society, a rule change is reasonable as long as the homosexuals gain more than 
heterosexuals lose.  
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion is the technique on which cost-benefit analyses are decided.133 As has been shown 
in the preceding chapter, the benefits of legalising same-sex marriage are likely to outweigh the costs 
associated with it. Hence, social welfare would – in theory – be increased if same-sex marriage is recognised.  
However, a decision based on the Kaldor-Hicks concept might not achieve this result because of its inherent 
endowment effect, i.e. the anti-homosexual status quo. The reliance interest can be used to privilege the 
preferences of those who see themselves as benefiting from the policy over the preferences of those who 
suffer from it:134 Since Kaldor-Hicks compensation requires that those benefiting from the recognition of 
same-sex marriages could hypothetically compensate the heterosexuals that feel offended by the rule change. 
However, the offer of the homosexual couples and the homosexual community who is willing to pay for the 
marriage option might not be large enough to buy off the heterosexuals, who experience these privileges 
already (heterosexuals largely outnumber homosexuals). Yet, if the entitlements are relocated so that same-sex 
couples could marry, the Kaldor-Hicks result would change at the same time. Then, conversely, the 
heterosexuals would be required to buy off the homosexuals’ right to marry. It is unlikely that they are willing 
to do so. 135 
If sexuality is not a commodity or a preference but a construct (by historical forces, culture etc.) there are 
additional reasons to doubt the ability of the Kaldor-Hicks analysis to determine the optimal regulation of 
sexuality.136 If homosexuality is socially constructed, this implies that the concept and the content of sexual 
orientation is not natural, biologically or otherwise fixed, but can be changed by society. Thus, regulations 
influence the attitudes endogenously. This implies that even those decisions that are based on a cost-benefit 
analysis could lead to unpredictable results. The society might implicitly agree not to change the status quo 
and touch critical issues since the consequences are difficult to foresee. This trend is reinforced by the fact 
that there is a lack of empirical data of inquiries for gay and lesbian relationships that might strengthen the 
arguments.137 
5.6 Rawls’ theory of justice 
The problems inherent in the application of the Pareto- and the Kaldor-Hicks-criterion might lead to the 
conclusion, that a change in legislation might not be reasonable from an economic point of view. However, 
when applying the Rawlsian theory of justice the endowment effect intrinsic in the Kaldor-Hicks-criterion can 
be avoided. Rawls’ fairness principle proposes that all those decisions are regarded as just that would be 
133 See Cooter, R. / Ulen, T. (2000),  p. 42. 
134 See Eskridge, W. (1992), p. 358.  
135 See Eskridge, W. (1992), p. 375-379. 
136 See Eskridge, W. (1992), p. 375. 
137 See Bartel, R. (2000a), p. 78.  
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accepted by all members of the community.138 The concept is based on the premise that in order to 
understand how fair conditions and cooperation can be introduced in society, it is helpful to put oneself in the 
position of the “original state”. The “original state” refers to a hypothetical situation under which all persons 
are believed to act. It is assumed that the members of society have the same information, but do not know 
their own position in the social order, i.e. they have an equal probability of being anyone. Under a veil of 
ignorance, they choose the environment that maximise their expected utility or well-being, anticipating the 
consequences from the current regulation. This fiction will help to make decisions in an unprejudiced manner, 
freed of unreasonable influences and merely based on one’s own moral capability. A concept of political 
justice would be selected, in which all members get the same chances, possibilities and rights.  
Applied to the topic of legalising same-sex marriage, Rawls’ theory of justice implies that individuals had to 
decide in a veil of ignorance, i.e. not knowing their sexual orientation, how the rights and entitlements would 
be allocated for homo- and heterosexual couples. The members of society would choose a regulation that is 
free of prejudices, where all individuals are treated in the same way and receive the same rights. Hence, not 
only heterosexuals but also homosexuals would receive the option to engage in long-lasting, legally recognised 
unions.139 Even if heterosexuals might find this situation difficult to apply, they might imaging that their 
children could be homosexual and that this uncertainty is large enough to abolish their prejudices.140 
5.7 Summary and proposal for change: Domestic partnership laws 
A family is commonly understood as a unit in society consisting of two or more adults living together and 
cooperating in the care and rearing of their own or adopted children.141 The marriage statute is facially neutral 
and technically applies to both, homosexual and heterosexual couples. Yet, even though homosexuals 
consider their relationships to be a family, it is not the image most people associate with the picture of it. For 
that reason several countries are still reluctant to legally recognise gay and lesbian unions. However, the 
hostility and the associated discrimination against gays and lesbians and the restrictions on who may marry are 
socially constructed. Neither is the antipathy of homosexuals a feature of all human societies nor has same-sex 
marriage always been rejected.142 Reforming the legal environment and regulations might overthrow the 
established attitudes and institutions. 
The present analysis intended to give an economic analysis of same-sex marriage, seeking for a justification or 
rejection for the legalisation of gay and lesbian partnerships. It has been argued that the objections against 
homosexual partnerships are - from an economic point of view – not founded.  
Traditionally, couples have been protected under the institution of marriage because of the positive value it 
enhances for the couples themselves and for society as a whole. The governments sought to shelter the 
138 See Schäfer, H.-B./ Ott, C. (2000),  pp. 46. 
139 This, however, is only true if the expected benefits from an unprejudiced society when being gay (i.e. the probability 
of being homosexual multiplied with the benefits of an unprejudiced society) exceed the expected benefits when being 
straight in a prejudiced society (i.e. the probability of being heterosexual multiplied with the benefits of an unprejudiced 
society). Else, individuals would decide for an option with discrimination. The problem can be overcome, if some values 
that harm others are not taken into consideration. 
140 See Bartel, R. (2000a), p. 71. 
141 See Nolo's Legal Encyclopaedia (2001).  
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women from the risk of expropriation of her investment in marriage and opportunistic behaviour by the 
husband. Taken the conventional assumptions about the roles in matrimony as given, same-sex couples would 
not require this protection. Since homosexual partners do not differ biologically, they do not benefit from the 
sexual division of labour, which fosters marital-specific investments and puts – especially in the presence of 
children - one partner at a disadvantage. In gay and lesbian unions both partners are likely to work in the 
labour market, they are more independent and are likely to keep their financial resources separately, they are 
not able to procreate, hence they do not need the stability and protection marriage implies.  
Yet, homosexual couples do engage in committing and long-lasting relationships. They do benefit from joint 
sharing.143 Even if their roles in marriage differ significantly from traditional gender responsibilities they do 
divide their labour and they do benefit from specialisation. They do invest in joint property and they do 
provide financial support to each other. Some do have children. Accordingly, homosexuals do need the 
insurance marriage provides, and they do require regulations that prevent them from the appropriation of the 
quasi-rents of their investments.  
Thus, the legal recognition of homosexual partnerships which is associated with the benefits and obligations 
marriage provides, brings a triple dividend for society:  
Firstly, a change in legislation might change the attitudes people associate with homosexuals, it reduces 
discrimination that not only benefits homosexuals but also society as a whole. The negative externalities 
associated with the discrimination of gays and lesbians that had negatively affected the efficiency of the 
economic system, resulting in a lower national income growth, could be abolished. Without being stigmatised 
and excluded, social and economic interactions operate more smoothly, efficiently and less costly.144 
Regardless of any individual's desire to get married, the gay and lesbian community would gain from the 
positive effect it entails. 
Secondly, homosexuals and society benefits from the “public good” created, the stability of same-sex 
relationships.145 
Thirdly, also heterosexuals, especially women, gain form the recognition. Since traditional assumptions on 
which marriage is based, no longer apply, recognising same-sex marriage can be a way to overcome the 
regulations that have reinforced the weak position of women in marriage and making it a sexist and 
patriarchal institution.146 
Nonetheless, some caution seems to be essential when implementing a change. If the public opinion and the 
legal reforms do not coincide, a reform of the laws might not bring about the desired effects and can have 
unfavourable drawbacks. Even though attitudes towards homosexuals and their way of life have changed, still 
widespread objections prevail when it comes to the legalisation of same-sex marriage and adoption. Marriage 
142 See Posner, R. (1998b), p. 577, and Eskridge, W. (1996), p.15-50. See supra note 131.  
143 Since joint consumption is more efficient the more equal the tastes are, homosexuals might even be able to form 
more economical units. 
144 See Bartel, R. (2000b), p. 11. 
145 In the final state of complete integration, a second “public good”, social peace, might be created, which is based on 
intermediate targets information, tolerance, understanding, acceptance, social equality and integration. See Bartel, R. 
(2000a), p. 64.  
146 See Matthaei, J. (1997), p. 156.  
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is an institution that involves not only economic benefits but entails also moral and religious values. 
Recognising homosexual unions will alter the institution of marriage. This change is appropriate and necessary 
since traditional assumptions are no longer suitable. However, the term “marriage” might be too valuable, 
hence applying this notion to homosexual coupes might not be accepted. Accordingly, in order to avoid costly 
and disruptive modifications in values it might be necessary to implement a reform gradually and make 
compromises when necessary.147 
If the public hostility to homosexuals is too widespread to make homosexual marriage a feasible proposal, 
though on balance cost justified and Pareto-improving, an intermediate solution such as limited rights 
provided by domestic partnership laws could be adopted.148 
Domestic partnerships laws with a registration system legally recognise and protect gay and lesbian 
relationships. They acknowledge the level of commitment under which people live together and enjoy the 
emotional and economic bonds as they do when marrying. Unmarried partners are required to file an affidavit 
attesting for living together for a specified time and share common necessities of life. The registered couple 
receives the rights and obligations of married couples for most of the practical purposes. This might improve 
the legal situation of same-sex couples, help to protect marital investments, especially children, and create 
barriers to exit, hence increasing the stability of the unions. The extension of benefits will promote social, 
emotional and economic stability of homosexual partners and of the family they create. This also increase 
society’s well-being because the partners will be more productive, more involved in their community and less 
likely to be dependant on social programs when being engaged in a stable relationship.149 
When introducing domestic partnership laws the package of legal rights associated with marriage can be split, 
and some “critical” marital rights can be contracted for. This enables the couples to replicate the strong 
statement of commitment entailed in the decision to marry by such contracts that are only terminable by 
death, serious wrongdoing or other dramatic changes of circumstances.150 The couples could furthermore 
decide which provisions they want to be included in their relationship. In order to economize on transaction 
costs, a menu of contracts (e.g. with different forms of retirement and health plans) can be provided, among 
which the couples can choose. This customization has the additional benefit of avoiding the terms and 
assumptions on which traditional marriage law is based. Efficiency losses because of ill-fitted rules are 
prevented and more appropriate rules for new family webs implemented. Consequently, domestic partnership 
laws combine the desirable effects of securing legal recognition and providing benefits and obligations to the 
couples while avoiding the traditional term of marriage. The ones strictly opposed to the notion of “marriage” 
to same-sex couples would not be offended,151 hence possible negative drawbacks could be avoided. Yet, even 
if domestic partnership laws might the most efficient solution from an economic point of view - they not only 
avoid ill-fitted rules for same-sex couples but also gradually approach the change of attitudes concerning the 
institution of marriage - homosexuals might still feel classified, if they perceive domestic partnerships not to 
147 See Eskridge, W. (1996), 88. 
148 See Posner, R. (1992), p. 313, Eskridge, W. (1996), p. 347. 
149 See Horne, P. (1994), p. 25. 
150 See Posner, R. (1998b), p. 569-70. 
151 See Wald, M. (1999), p. 18, and Kubasek, N., / Jennings, K./ Browne, S. (1994),  p. 12. 
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be a full substitute for marriage. Domestic partnerships however can be introduced as a parallel institution, 
which is only granted to homosexual couples. This exclusivity might secure some of the symbolic values 
entailed in marriage. It might be too early to change society’s values radically, but domestic partnership 
ordinances are a way ahead. 
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7 Appendix 
Regulations in the EU relating to same-sex marriage 
Recently, almost all European countries put effort with respect to the regulations of same-sex unions. 
Denmark was the first country that adopted a registered partnership law in 1989, Sweden followed suit in 
1995. The Netherlands - after having introduced a domestic partnership law in 1998 - is the first country in 
Europe allowing homosexual couples to marry. This option is available since the 1st of  April 2001.  
On the 12th of  March 2000 the European Parliament passed a resolution which recommended that same-sex 
unions be granted the same legal recognition as heterosexual marriages. It called on all 15 members of the 
European Union "to make rapid progress in the area of mutual recognition of the various forms of living together legally, but 
not of a conjugal character, and of legal marriages between persons of the same-sex." The vote was 265 to 125 with 33 
abstentions.  
The following table gives a brief overview of how the 15 EU member states treat homosexual couples with 
respect to the recognition to their partnership and children.  
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COUNTRY REGULATION
Austria o Austria does not legally recognise same-sex partner(ship)s. Gay and lesbian couples are discriminated against both, in comparison with married
couples and non-married opposite-sex couples (companions of life) who already have a wide range of legal rights (and duties), although they do
not completely enjoy the same rights as spouses yet.
o Same-sex partners are excluded from any legal definition of “next of kin” or “significant other” and treated by law as complete aliens to each other.
o Homosexuals cannot adopt children as couples, but they can as singles as long as they do not reveal their sexual orientation. It is impossible to co-
adopt the biological child of one’s same-sex partner to obtain joint custody over the partner’s children.
o Lesbians and all single women are excluded from artificial insemination or in-vitro fertilisation methods, those are restricted to married women or
women in long-term heterosexual partnerships.
Belgium o Belgium has introduced a domestic partnership law, Cohabitation legale, a statutory cohabitation contract, which is available to any two adults who
are not otherwise married or contracted, regardless of their gender or blood relationship; it is signed before a notary public and entered into the
register of the town where they live. The contract gives access to the courts in event of a property dispute upon dissolution; and imposes joint
liability for living expenses, proportionate to the means of the partners. Hence since 1999 homosexual couples are treated equal to married
partners, yet there is no legal marital status for couples of the same-sex.
o Belgium will presumably be the 2nd county in the EU, where homosexual couples will be granted the same rights as married couples. A draft for
homosexual marriage is assumed to be enforced next year. Yet, same-sex partners will not be allowed to adopt children.
o Since the mid 1990s cities such as Ghent and Antwerp allowed same-sex couples to register their partnership. This has mostly symbolic character,
but there were also legal consequences following the registration.
Denmark o Denmark was the first country, in 1989, to allow same-sex couples to form "registered partnerships," giving them a status and benefits similar to
marriage (with some exceptions).
o The registered partnership is a parallel institution to marriage only available to homosexual couples.
o Partnership guarantees certain rights that were previously restricted to married couples: inheritance, insurance plans, pension, social benefits,
income tax reductions, unemployment benefits and social benefits. It also makes them responsible for alimony payments if they divorce. Allows
foreign partners of its homosexual citizenry to receive residency permits.
o One of the partners in a registered partnership must be a Danish citizen and live in Denmark. This requirement was introduced to avoid an inflow
of couples travelling to Denmark only marry.
o Since 1999, registered gay and lesbian couples are allowed to adopt their partner's children. However, they are still not able to adopt children from
outside of their partnership.
o Artificial insemination is not possible for lesbians.
o Church weddings are impossible.
o Since the domestic partnership laws have been introduced, only some thousand couples have taken advantages of the option, approximately 2/3 of
them gay men.
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Finland o Finland currently prepares a registered partnership law. Yet, the draft that has been first introduced in 1996 has not been accepted. The adoption
of a nationwide partner registration law can be expected by the end of the century.
o There is no procedure or custom other than marriage whereby a partnership (be it heterosexual or homosexual) can be registered. Same-sex
couples have been treated as couples living in marriage-like relationships when the wording of the law allows it.
o Pension and inheritance rights do not apply to homosexual partners or heterosexual common-law partners unless the couple has a common child.
o The immigration office does not distinguish between heterosexual and homosexual common-law couples. Residence permits have been granted on
the basis of a homosexual relationship. However, a prove is necessary showing that the couple has lived together for at least one year in order to
qualify for a residence permit. Naturally, this causes problems for many couples.
o For insurance purposes a homosexual partnership counts as a marriage provided the couple has signed into a mutual-support contract.
o Adoption is possible for single persons or married couples. There is a lack of information on whether single lesbians have been accepted as
adoptive mothers. There are no known cases of any decisions denying parents parenting rights because of their homosexuality.
o There is no law concerning artificial insemination. Lesbian couples have been able to use non-governmental artificial insemination services.
France o France has introduced a partnership law in 1999 (11/1999) (Civil Solidarity Pacts (PACS)), which applies to both, homosexuals and heterosexuals.
o Registered couples, gay or straight, are granted many of the rights of marriage. The law applies in areas such as income tax, inheritance, housing,
immigration, health benefits, job transfers, synchronized vacation time, responsibility for debts, and social welfare, public insurance and pension
benefits, lease protections, and even the right to demand concurrent vacation schedules. In addition, property acquired together is considered
jointly owned unless an agreement states otherwise.
o It does not grant equality in the areas of parental rights, adoption or medically assisted procreation.
o Unlike heterosexual couples who get married, registered partners will tie the knot before a court rather than at the town hall. They also will not be
allowed to file a joint tax return until they have been together three years. Married people can do so immediately.
o Homosexuals cannot adopt children as couples, but they can as singles as long as they do not reveal their sexual orientation. It is impossible to co-
adopt the biological child of one’s same-sex partner to obtain joint custody over the partner’s children. Unmarried heterosexuals cannot adopt
either.
o Artificial insemination for lesbians is impossible.
o Since the introduction of the PAC already 37.000 couples have taken the option of registering their partnership, the percentage of homo- and
heterosexual couples, however, is unclear. In Paris approximately 30% of those registered are homosexuals, in the rest of the country, estimates
yield up to 40%.
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Germany o Germany will adopt a countrywide registered partnership law on 1st of August 2001. Currently, this partnership laws is only possible in Hamburg.
o The countrywide registered partnership law will allow gay and lesbian couples to register their partnerships; give them hospital visitation rights;
grant German resident status to foreign partners in binational couples; extend to gay and lesbian co-parents some parental rights with respect to
their partners' biological children; give couples status identical to married couples for purposes of tenancy, inheritance (excluding inheritance
taxes), pensions, and health insurance; and require a formal legal process for dissolution of partnerships, and provision for one partner to collect
support from the other afterwards if necessary.
o Artificial insemination for lesbians is impossible.
o Since 04/ 1999 Hamburg offers a domestic partner registry for same-sex couples, allowing hospital visitation rights, and federally subsidized low-
rent housing to registered partners. However, the so called “Hamburg marriage” rather has a symbolic meaning, there are no legal consequences.
Yet, the authorities assist partners to privately contract in areas such as the sharing of household costs, how to deal with joint wealth and debts and
provisions for sickness and death.
o Since the “Hamburg marriage” has been introduced, 150 lesbians and gay couples have chosen to register their relationship.
Greek o Greek does not legally recognise same-sex couples.
o Both single people and married couples can adopt. It is, therefore, theoretically possible for a single lesbian or gay man to adopt a child. However,
the “suitability” of prospective single parents is checked by a court and, in practice, anyone who turns out to be gay would almost certainly not be
approved.
o There do not appear to be any provisions specifically denying lesbians access to artificial insemination.
Ireland o Ireland does not have a law which provides for the registration of lesbian/gay marriages or partnerships.
o The Powers of Attorney Act provides for a legal instrument which enables to choose a person to deal with property and financial affairs and take
personal care decisions on behalf in case of mental incapability. The Act implicitly includes lesbian and gay relationships, in that a person can
appoint anyone to be their attorney including a lesbian or gay partner or friend.
o The law on adoption discriminates against lesbians and gay men as well as all unmarried persons. Adoption is only possible for legally married,
widowed or judicially separated people. The regional health boards are responsible for fostering of children and, in theory at least, lesbians and gay
men would be eligible to foster children.
o There is no legislation or codes prohibiting artificial insemination for lesbians.
Italy o Italy recognizes a group of cohabiting persons tied by bonds of affection as being included in the countries official definition of a family. The new
definition also applies to inheritance laws and wills.
o Only married couples are allowed to adopt children.
o Pisa and Florence allow same-sex couples to register as domestic partners.
o Bologna allocates public housing units to homosexual couples.
o The Italian supreme court ruled (on 4/11/00) that homosexuality is a “psychiatric illness or disorder.” gays are “psychologically incapable of
assuming their conjugal obligations” and have “a grave inability to carry out the duties of matrimony.”
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Luxembourg o Luxembourg does not legally recognizes same-sex partnerships. 1996 a bill was introduced for establishing “Registered Partnership” for same-sex
couples. The Greens opted for opening up marriage for same-sex couples and, thus, for complete equality between opposite-sex and same-sex
couples. No vote has yet taken place on these two bills.
The
Netherlands
o The Netherlands introduced a registered partnership law on 01/1998.
o On 19/12/ 2000, the upper house of the Dutch government has passed a bill that enlarges the concept of marriage in the Netherlands. Effective
since the 1st of April 2001, gay and lesbian couples, who are either citizens of the Netherlands or who have residency permits, are able to marry and
adopt. This makes the Netherlands the first country in recent history having legalized homosexual marriages.
o The couples currently registered may transform their partnership into marriage and vice versa. See Waaldijk, K. (2001) for details.
o Gay couples are granted complete parity with married heterosexual couples. Same-sex couples can marry at city hall and adopt Dutch children.
They will be able to divorce through the court system, like heterosexual couples.
o Since the partnership law has been introduced, 18288 couples have registered until 04/ 2001. 6651 of those are homosexuals, 11637 heterosexual
couples.
Portugal o Portugal will grant same-sex couples who have lived together for more than two years the same rights as heterosexual couples in marriages, rights
in such areas as vacations, taxes, inheritance, pensions, housing contracts and rental leases. The new law will not allow gay couples to adopt
children. The effective date for this new law has not yet been set.
o The current housing law does not distinguish between homosexual and heterosexual couples. Hence, it would equally apply to opposite-sex and
same-sex couples. In case of the death of the tenant, the lease is not automatically inherited by the bereaved partner but (s)he has preferential right
to keep the lease.
Spain o Spain introduced a registered partnership law in 1998/99 in parts of the country or legislation, and is expected to take up the issue of nationwide
registered partnerships by the end of the century
o A nationwide law allows a widowed partner to remain in rental housing when only the deceased signed the lease. Homosexual couples are eligible
for health care benefits, they have access to state widower’s pensions, and alimony in the event of a separation.
o Many cities and some regions allow same-sex couples to register as domestic partners.
o The northern city of Vitoria allows gay couples to register (officially declare their commitment to each other). This helps couples to apply for social
security and loans, and rent property, and as proof in legal cases involving pensions and wills, however it does not affect taxes.
o Aragon and Catalonia have same-sex domestic partner laws, the laws can only recognize the obligations between the individuals involved in a
partnership, but cannot regulate the government's relationship with the partnership. There can be support payments by one partner to the other if
the couple splits up, but not the government support for a survivor if one member dies that a traditional widow might collect. Unmarried
heterosexual couples and same-gender couples are treated the same in most respects under the laws, except that adoption rights are denied to gay
and lesbian couples. Couples are defined as two unmarried, unrelated individuals of legal age in a relationship of mutual affection who have lived
together for two years, who register with the regional administration.
o The state of Navarro allows adoptions by same-gender couples. The law says that couples who enjoy "a free and public union in an affectionate
relationship, independent of sexual orientation ... can adopt children with the same rights and duties as those couples united in matrimony."
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Sweden o Sweden introduced a registered partnership law in 1995
o Sweden's law is similar to Denmark's, allowing same-sex couples to register their partnerships in order to receive many of the rights and obligations
of marriage.
o Foreign partners of its homosexual citizenry can receive residency permits.
o Registered homosexual couples are neither allowed to adopt children nor have them through alternative insemination.
o Church weddings are impossible.
United
Kingdom
o The UK does not allow lesbian and gay couples to marry. Furthermore, there is no legal provision for the recognition by the state of same-sex
partnerships. Recently, the recognition of cohabiting heterosexual couples living “as man and wife”, has been discussed in legislation and social
policy, but this has not, generally, extended to same-sex couples.
o Generally there is no discrimination against gays to adopt, but may face difficulties.
Sources: Bartels, R. (2000a), FAZ (2001a), FAZ (2001b), ILGA Europe (1998), Nolo’s Legal Encyclopaedia (2001), Waaldijk, K. (2001).
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